The article examines wittgenstein's theory of quantification as it appears in the "tractatus". it is argued that wittgenstein advances a theory of quantification and a theory of generality where most contemporary writers on the subject hold a single theory of quantification incorporating both quantification proper and generality. having established this it is shown that wittgenstein theory of quantification is truth functional and not substitutional as recent authors have suggested.

To rise from the dead and live in the age to come is the appointed destiny of the children of God. In that continuing personal life they are like angels and can no longer die, for as children of the resurrection they are children of God. He is the God, not of the dead, but of the living, for in him all are alive. That was the message of Jesus handed down to us through the Evangelists as an essential part (...) of the Gospel. Jesus did not speak of an ‘immortality’ which depends on the natural force of the soul to resist the corruption of death, but spoke instead of a life-relation with God which cannot terminate for it is anchored beyond our mortal existence in the ever-living God himself. He preferred to speak of this as ‘eternal life’ which is freely given by the heavenly Father to his children on earth and which, far from ending with death, results in a resurrection to a fullness of imperishable life in God. (shrink)

Spontaneous abortion is rarely addressed in moral evaluations of abortion. Indeed, 'abortion' is virtually always taken to mean only induced abortion. After a brief review of medical aspects of spontaneous abortion, I attempt to articulate the moral implications of spontaneous abortion for the two poles of the abortion debate, the strong pro-abortion and the strong anti-abortion positions. I claim that spontaneous abortion has no moral relevance for strict pro-abortion positions but that the high incidence of spontaneous abortion is not (as (...) some claim) eo ipso any sort of justification for voluntarily induced abortion. Secondly, I show that if the strict anti-abortionist position is to be taken seriously in its insistence that prenatal life has a right to be protected by virtue of its being conceived, then it seems necessary to take measures to prevent spontaneous abortion and its presumptive causes, and this as a matter of moral obligation. (shrink)

Theologies may be divided into two distinct types which, for the purpose of this essay, may be called ‘interactionist’ and ‘dualist’. By an interactionist theology I mean one in which God is thought of as interacting closely with the world of nature and history without being confused with it, and by a dualist theology I mean one in which God is thought of as separated from the world of nature and history by a measure of deistic distance. Obviously there are (...) degrees of closeness and distance, while their extremes tend to pass over into each other. Thus a theology in which God is thought of as so transcendentally other that he cannot be the ‘object’ of our knowledge, as in the thought of Schleiermacher, can only acquire content through constructions out of our immanent religious consciousness. Nevertheless a working distinction between interactionist and dualist theologies may serve a useful purpose in helping us to get into the heart of the problem. (shrink)

In the course of discussing Kleisthenes' reforms, the author of theAthenaion Politeiamakes the following statement:And he made those who were currently living in each of the demes demesmen of one another, so that they would not examine the new citizens by calling out their patronymic, rather they would announce them by demes; and from this practice, the Athenians call themselves after their demes.

There are religious and philosophical versions of the thesis that AIDS is a punishment for homosexual behaviour. It is argued here that the religious version is seriously incomplete. Because of this incompleteness and because of the indeterminacies that ordinarily attend religious argumentation, it is concluded that the claim may be set aside as unconvincing. Homosexual behaviour is then judged for its morality against utilitarian, deontological, and natural law theories of ethics. It is argued that such behaviour involves no impediment to (...) important moral goals and is not therefore immoral. Where natural law might be used to condemn homosexual behaviour, it is argued that the theory itself is not well established. Consequently there is a prima facie reason for rejecting the philosophical version of the punishment thesis. This conclusion is further supported by noting the lack of proportion between the purported immorality of homosexuality and a punishment as devastating as AIDS. (shrink)

Current interpretations of Plato’s cave are obviously incorrect because they do not explain how what we hear does not come from what we see. I argue that Plato is saying that the colors we receive from our faculty of vision do not cause the sounds that we receive from our faculty of hearing. I also show how we do not see ourselves or one other, how the shadows on the wall of the cave are images of that which casts them (...) and therefore have less reality than them, and how the cave illustrates the divided line’s concern for the relationship between Forms and visible reality. The paper is structured around the two great riddles of the divided line: how Forms can be more real than everyday objects, and how one can know the unhypothesized beginning with complete certainty. I further argue that the puppets that cast shadows stand for the immanent Forms of the Phaedo and also for the moving Forms of the Timaeus. That of which these puppets are themselves images would thus stand for the Forms as they are in themselves of the Phaedo or the indestructible Forms of the Timaeus. ‘Plato used to ask whether the discussion was proceeding from or leading up to fundamental principles, just as in a race course there is a difference between running from the judges to the far end of the track and running back again.’ – Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1095. (shrink)

It is shown that Plato’s Lysis is full of positive content between the lines. At the close of the dialogue Socrates says that he considers Lysis, Menexenus, and himself to be friends of one another. Following up on the questions which the dialogue leads us to ask yields an explanation ofwhy each of these instances of friendship is, in fact, an instance of friendship. In addition, the dialogue shows that there are five types of motivation for desiring something.

Socrates contradicts himself when he claims that a good doctor must have the experience of having an unsound body and when he claims that a good judge must have a sound soul, for the unsound of body will not be treated and how a judge decides the case of a good person is a matter of indifference. These pages are really about the meaning of simplicity of soul, and arguing against Glaucon's claim, 'to be moved by self-advantage is the end (...) which it is natural to pursue as good, until forcibly turned aside by law and custom to respect equality'. (shrink)

This article shows that Plato is discussing Pauline predication and Pauline self-predication in the Phaedo. The key is the recognition that the “something else” of Phaedo 103e2-5 cannot be a sensible object because any such object which participates in Form ‘X’ can sometimes appear not to be x. It is argued that Plato has not written in a straightforward manner, but rather has written a series of riddles for the reader to solve. Thus this dialogue is an example of the (...) playful use of the written word discussed at Phaedrus 275ff. (shrink)

This article shows that Plato is discussing Pauline predication and Pauline self-predication in the Phaedo. The key is the recognition that the “something else” of Phaedo 103e2-5 cannot be a sensible object because any such object which participates in Form ‘X’ can sometimes appear not to be x. It is argued that Plato has not written in a straightforward manner, but rather has written a series of riddles for the reader to solve. Thus this dialogue is an example of the (...) playful use of the written word discussed at Phaedrus 275ff. (shrink)

This article shows that Plato is discussing Pauline predication and Pauline self-predication in the Phaedo. The key is the recognition that the “something else” of Phaedo 103e2-5 cannot be a sensible object because any such object which participates in Form ‘X’ can sometimes appear not to be x. It is argued that Plato has not written in a straightforward manner, but rather has written a series of riddles for the reader to solve. Thus this dialogue is an example of the (...) playful use of the written word discussed at Phaedrus 275ff. (shrink)